

**Recognition through Deliberation:  
Towards Deliberative Accommodation of Cultural Diversity**

Selen Ayirtman  
Australian National University  
Research School of Social Sciences  
Political Science Program  
[Selen.Ayirtman@anu.edu.au](mailto:Selen.Ayirtman@anu.edu.au)

Australasian Political Studies Association Annual Conference  
Monash University  
Melbourne, Australia  
24–26 September 2007

Political and Social Theory Stream

## **Abstract**

This paper aims to develop an anti-essentialist notion of 'politics of recognition' and multiculturalism from a perspective of deliberative democracy. It argues that the way culture and identity are conceptualised has significant implications both for multiculturalism and democracy. By taking the constructivist approach of culture and identity formation seriously, it argues that a deliberative approach promises to go beyond the limitations inherent in the essentialist responses to cultural diversity both on conceptual and institutional terms. The suggested deliberative accommodation of cultural diversity requires, above all, the existence of formal rights and opportunities enabling ongoing and open-ended struggles of recognition. At the same time, equally important for this approach are the informal types of recognition implying citizens' attitudes towards one another and the prevailing discourses of cultural diversity in a given society.

## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Liberalism is often regarded as the most suitable doctrine for accommodating and advancing individual differences in modern societies. However, as its critics argue, this is not true for all types of differences that are at stake in such societies. For ethnic or cultural differences, classical liberal formula based on the separation of public and private spheres and the location of culture within the latter seems to reach its boundaries. Such an approach fails to capture the significance of culture and ethnicity for individuals, groups and, ultimately, democratic politics. Taking this deficit of liberalism as their point of departure, critics have suggested alternative strategies for accommodating cultural diversity under the rubric of ‘politics of recognition’. The central claim of such politics is to correct the subordinate position of the disadvantaged ethnic groups by granting them special rights and entitlements. These policies, also known as multiculturalism, aim to facilitate a greater inclusion and integration of marginalised groups in culturally diverse societies. However, despite its inclusive tendency, under certain circumstances, the politics of recognition fails to provide productive ground for inclusive politics in culturally diverse societies. This is especially so when the politics of recognition is based on the ‘essentialist’ account of culture and ethnicity. When ethnicity is understood as given and pre-politically extant, multicultural policies might easily lead to fixation and homogenisation of identities at stake. This paper seeks to conceptualise an alternative approach to the politics of recognition in the face of cultural diversity. It argues that a deliberative perspective suggests an alternative, dynamic account of the politics of recognition and multiculturalism. This account emphasises the ‘constructed’ nature of culture and identity, and seeks to elucidate the necessary conditions of recognition in both formal and informal spheres. I argue that the formal rights and entitlements are important but not sufficient conditions for an anti-essentialist, deliberative notion of recognition.

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<sup>1</sup> I am grateful to my supervisor John Dryzek for his guidance and comments on the earlier version of this paper. This paper has benefited from presentations at the ANU Deliberative Democracy Group and the 55<sup>th</sup> Australasian Political Studies Association Annual Conference, and from comments of two anonymous reviewers. My work on this paper also owes a great deal to a series of conversations with Volkan Cidam and Ricardo Mendonça.

I initially outline the existing critiques of the politics of recognition in the context of multiculturalism. I argue that multiculturalism, as a politics of recognition, does not have to be associated with an essentialised notion of identity. Multiculturalism takes different forms depending on the underlying notions of culture and identity. Given this, in the second part of the paper I highlight the existing approaches to culture and reveal their implications for the politics of recognition and multiculturalism. Finally, I sketch the key characteristics of deliberative democracy and the necessary institutional arrangements for a deliberative notion of recognition in the face of cultural diversity. The paper concludes that deliberative democracy opens up new ways of thinking about multiculturalism and politics of recognition which do not fall into the trap of essentialism.

## **I Critiques of Politics of Recognition in the Context of Multiculturalism**

The critique of multiculturalism is as old as the idea of multiculturalism itself. Since its first use in the 1950s, both the idea and the politics of ‘multiculturalism’ have been subject to intense criticism. The reasons for its rejection vary considerably. The most common type of criticism multiculturalism faces comes from its conservative critics. They argue that multiculturalism is against the maintenance of a unified national identity, and it leads to segregation by undermining interpersonal trust and solidarity in culturally diverse societies. Liberal opponents of multiculturalism, conversely, are less interested in the problems associated with trust, solidarity or unity. For them, multicultural policies are dangerous as they undermine the liberal principles of equality and impartiality. The policies mostly emphasise the irreconcilable nature of universal individual rights with the particularistic ethnic group rights. Opponents are convinced that recognition of group-specific rights means denying the equal treatment of the individual (Barry 2001; Kukathas 1998). They argue that liberalism, by protecting the individual freedom of association, already suggests the best possible strategy for accommodating cultural diversity (Habermas 1998 ; Kukathas 1998). Other liberals are concerned about the practicality of politics based on the group identities. Claus Offe, for example, notes that:

even the most demanding and utopian version of liberal universalism and individualism is a more promising and more realistic project of maintaining political unity than the alternative proposal of building a unity on the recognition of group identities (Offe 2003)

Some feminist scholars suggest that multiculturalism and feminism stand in tension to one another, notably Susan Moller Okin, who argues that multiculturalism is bad for women (Okin 1999). On her account, feminism requires liberal individualism, while cultural group rights allow for greater inequality between women and men. The most common concern is that multiculturalism leads to a fixation and homogenisation of identities by ‘locking’ individuals into certain features. Similarly, Markell points out the potential injustice politics of recognition might cause. Although the politics of recognition aim to emancipate individuals, it binds them to certain identities. Consequently, it leads to individuals “bound by recognition—honoured and constrained” (Markell 2003:193)

It is possible to extend the list of critics by focusing on internal differences within each stream of critique. Instead, I focus on the commonalities between these critics and argue that the literature on politics of recognition and multiculturalism has two closely interrelated shortcomings. The first is related to critics’ point of departure. The critics presented in the existing literature tend to associate multiculturalism with the essentialised, fixed conception of culture. They are uninterested in the question of where culture comes from, when it becomes the significant part of identity and under which circumstances it might be transformed. The second shortcoming of the literature is about the institutionalisation of this concept. Multiculturalism, as a politics of recognition, is usually associated only with political demand for special representation of marginalised groups. Consequently, it is understood as the existence of *thick* group rights based on an essentialised and fixed conception of culture. Defining multiculturalism as such, most critics fail to notice that multiculturalism can manifest itself in a variety of forms depending on the underlying conceptions of culture and identity. The following outlines different approaches to culture and identity, and their implications for the consequent forms of multiculturalism as politics of recognition.

## II Unpacking the Notion of Culture in Multiculturalism

The question of whether and to what extent culture is relevant for liberal democracies has always been a tricky and contested one. In the literature, this issue is usually addressed within the framework of, and through the dichotomies created by, the well-known debate between liberalism and communitarianism (Sandel 1982). This debate is polarised around two possible strategies of accommodating cultural diversity: privatisation; and protection of individuals' cultural attachments. While the first strategy aims to exclude identity claims from the public sphere, the second one insists on their inclusion and thus aims to grant them exceptional status. The literature on culture and democracy seems to oscillate between these two strategies. Although framed as opposite strategies, closer examination reveals that they depend on the same premise. They both take individuals' cultural attachments as given, fixed and pre-politically extant, and seek ways to accommodate it. In so doing, I argue that both strategies presuppose an essentialist understanding of culture and identity. Before identifying the implications of such a starting point for democracy and politics of recognition, I outline the core characteristics of the essentialist approach and its alternatives.

Essentialism is defined “as a belief in true essence—that which is most irreducible, unchanging, and therefore constitutive of a given person or thing” (Fuss 1989:2). Fuss notes that this definition represents the traditional Aristotelian understanding of essence and it has been the dominant way of thinking in Western metaphysics (Fuss 1989). The essentialist approach claims that everything has a real essence that is unique, irreducible and unchanging. In the context of ethnic politics, essentialists regard culture and ethnicity as the fixed features of individuals. As critics rightly argue, essentialism produces a false description of cultures by defining them not only as static in time and place, but also as uniform (Said 1995). Essentialism falls short in addressing intra-cultural diversity and therefore fails to offer a suitable framework for a politics of difference (Squires 2002).

When based on the essentialist account of culture, multiculturalism tends to suppress the heterogeneity which exists in each culture, and creates binary oppositions between

cultures. Stratton and Ang, for example, argue that the cultural diversity embodied in official multiculturalism of Australia tends to construct a binary opposition between ‘ethnic communities’ and Australian society, “as if the two were mutually exclusive, internally homogenous entities. Such a representation, not only constructs the latter as ‘always devaluing, hierarchising, othering’ the former, but also pigeonholes ‘the migrant’ as permanently marginalised, forever ethnicised” (Stratton and Ang 1999:158). Similarly, Modood notes that many Europeans consider multiculturalism as “antithetical to rather than as a reformer of national identity”(Modood 2007).

An anti-essentialist perspective on culture and identity is presented by constructionism. As a critique of essentialism, constructivists claim that essence itself is a historical production. Constructivism refuses the existence of true essence and argues that whatever appears as ‘natural’ or ‘given’ actually emerges ‘socially’ and as a result of discursive practices. Identity is not fixed; it is continually renegotiated through interactive effort, via linguistic exchange and social performance (Cerulo 1997:387). As Taylor states:

my discovering my own identity doesn’t mean that I work it out in isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others. [...] My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others (Taylor 1992:34).

The definition of identities as dialogically and discursively constructed entities leads constructionists to focus on the mechanisms of their *production* and *maintenance*. These include not only the formal institutional settings in a given society, but also social practices, the systems of representation, cultural symbols and the role of ideology and discourses. By emphasising the relational feature of identity, a constructivist approach reveals that neither identity nor culture has an essence, and both are subject to constant changes.

Given the differences between essentialist and constructivist approaches, literature regards ideas associated with “essential unity, integrity, discreteness and fixity” as reactionary, and the constructivist ideas of “internal differentiation, interaction and fluidity” as progressive (Modood 1998:378). Although the essentialist and constructivist approaches seem analytically distinct, it is difficult to disentangle them in practice.

Scholars note the demarcation between essentialism and constructionism is not as solid as the advocates of both sides assume (Fuss 1989; Squires 2002). Ultimately, constructivism depends fundamentally on essentialism for the basis of its critique. These two approaches have different implications for the subsequent politics of recognition and democracy. I argue that the constructivist approach to culture enables a better response to some criticism the politics of recognition has been facing.

The answer to the fundamental question, whether culture and ethnicity are changeable or not, has important bearings on defining the institutions and practice of democracy in culturally diverse societies. While conceptualising cultural identities, the constructivist approach offers a suitable point of departure. It focuses on the question of where culture comes from, when it becomes a significant part of an individual identity and how it might be transformed. These are difficult questions, especially concerning the institutionalisation of cultural attachments on legal and political terms. If cultural identities are subject to constant change, as claimed by the constructivists, what kind of institutions are needed to capture this constant change? Would not any attempt of institutionalising the differences first create those differences? The literature on cultural identity identifies the essentialising role of institutions as a problem, but fails to provide alternative solutions for accommodating cultural diversity. In filling this gap, the constructivist approach merits particular attention. It reminds us that cultural identities or ethnic communities do not exist prior to legal and political institutions, but are partly shaped by those institutions. If we follow constructivism, we need a particular, dynamic kind of politics of recognition which should serve to recognise cultural differences without essentialising them. The required institutional arrangements should provide the conditions under which the “value of culture” should perpetually be re-formulated and re-negotiated according to cultural members’ changing perceptions (Festenstein 2005). The deliberative approach is capable of suggesting alternative ways of accommodating cultural differences that are constructed.

### III Deliberative Accommodation of Cultural Diversity

If culture and identity are dialogically constructed, their recognition requires a particular model of democracy. The sought model of democracy must meet at least two tests: recognise cultural differences; and provide the conditions to facilitate the interaction and transformation of those differences. It should recognise that cultural and ethnic identities and groups are not fixed but fluid and open to change. Only in this way can an anti-essentialist account of multiculturalism be conceptualised. At the centre of this approach is a dynamic concept of recognition. The core characteristics of the deliberative approach and its significance in the face of cultural diversity are outlined next.

Deliberative democracy is designed as a response to the legitimisation problems liberal democracies have been facing. It aims to enhance the legitimacy of collective decisions by means of fair public deliberation among free and equal parties. On this account, the core of democratic legitimacy is seen in terms of the right, capacity and opportunity of those affected by a collective decision to participate in the making of those decisions (Cohen 1989; Dryzek 2000). Here, the collective decision-making is not understood in a limited sense as the aggregation of the preferences; rather, it is conceptualised on broader terms as series of interaction both in the formal and informal spheres. As such, deliberative democracy suggests more than a theory of decision-making. This approach is also concerned about the conditions facilitating “social learning” (Dryzek 2000; Kanra 2005), “mutual understanding” (Gutmann and Thompson 2004) and “cooperation” among deliberating individuals (Bohman 1996). Given these attributes, a number of scholars regard deliberative democracy as the “key for securing just relations among ethnic or cultural groups” (James 2003:157). They argue that deliberative democracy is particularly suited for culturally diverse societies (Valedez 2001:6), as it “can offer compelling answers to the challenges posed by multiculturalist demands” (Benhabib 2002:106).

Despite the agreement on the significance of the deliberative approach in the face of cultural diversity, the question of what constitutes deliberative democracy under such

circumstances is a contested one. However, within the context of this paper and for the sake of brevity, I define as my benchmark three key characteristics of this approach that also explain how deliberative democracy responds to the challenges raised by the constructed notion of culture. These characteristics are (i) dialogical and intersubjective mutuality, (ii) transformative potential of public deliberation and (iii) the ability to revise the decisions. These three features merit attention in the face of cultural diversity; especially concerning recognition of cultural identities that are subject to constant change. These features are clarified next by underlining their relevance within the context of this paper.

The first key feature of the deliberative approach is the ‘dialogical and intersubjective mutuality’ it requires. The deliberative approach emphasises “the intersubjective formation of individual identities through confrontation and interaction with other(s).” (Behnabib 2002:50). It distances itself from the liberal presuppositions of identity which are based on an *a priori* concept of human nature. The social contract tradition of liberalism assumes an historical account of human nature which leads “human beings begin their history endowed with a certain set of properties” (Parekh 2000:118). The deliberative theory puts emphasis on the intersubjective constitution of the self through dialogical practices. If cultural differences are not the reflection of pre-given ethnic identities but the results of interactive efforts, the dialogical feature of deliberative democracy gains particular significance. Rather than beginning with a notion of pre-existing ‘subject’ then trying to explain how that subject relates to others, a deliberative approach begins from a notion of interrelationship and its significance for identity-building. The notion of recognition is embedded in the process of identity constitution. As such, it requires ‘*mutuality*’ which goes far beyond the familiar plea for toleration. The dialogical notion of recognition requires reciprocal action in the process of identity constitution.

The second key feature is to emphasise the ‘transformative potential’ of this participatory model. The deliberative approach is claimed to be ‘transformative’, as it requires engagement in public dialogue, which subsequently leads to change in the judgements,

preferences and attitudes of the deliberating individuals (Dryzek 2000; Saward 2000; Young 2000). In the literature, the transformative potential of this participatory approach is conceptualised mainly in terms of preference transformation, whereas its potential in transforming individual identities has received little attention. Yet, deliberative democracy can facilitate identity transformation through mutual, dialogical and intersubjective interaction. Some scholars argue that the deliberative approach can suggest a suitable framework for a politics of negotiation, even over the content of the national culture and identity. With the help of collective deliberation, the national identity can be transformed in a way that reflects the cultural plurality in a given society (Kirloskar-Steinbach 2004).

The third key feature of the deliberative approach is ‘revisability’. Given the plurality and incommensurability of fundamental values in culturally diverse societies, there can be no resolution that is definitive. From a deliberative perspective, every resolution must be open to further democratic dissent and renegotiation. Ideally, any proposed resolution should rest as much as possible on the discussion and agreement of those affected by it. The proposed resolutions should be seen as ongoing provisional agreements open to revision and correction. In the context of multiculturalism, the deliberative notion of recognition can be characterised as an ongoing struggle of identities that does not necessarily lead to a final state of harmony. Recognition of cultural identities should not be seen as an end state, but rather as a provisional and continuous process of democratic activity. As Tully argues:

Recognition in theory and practice should not be seen as a *telos* or end state, but as a partial, provisional, mutual, and human-all-too-human part of continuous processes of democratic activity in which citizens struggle to change their rules of mutual recognition as they change themselves (Tully 2000:477).

In other words, the aim of democratic politics should not be “to discover and constitutionalize *the* just and definitive form of recognition” but to ensure the conditions enabling ongoing struggles of recognition (Tully 2000). According to this approach, an anti-essentialist account of recognition and multiculturalism requires above all the existence of dialogical mechanisms facilitating open-ended transformation.

#### **IV Institutional Arrangements: Formal and Informal Conditions of a Deliberative Notion of Recognition**

The politics of recognition based on a constructed account of culture clearly differs from an essentialist account by taking *intra*-cultural differences seriously. The progressive proponents of multiculturalism (Benhabib 2002, Deveaux 2003, Modood 1998, Squires 2002 and Tully 2000) emphasise the internal diversity within cultures and try to devise ways of avoiding the perception and institutionalisation of cultures as internally homogenous entities in binary opposition. The recent United Nations report on gender justice points out that “the history of internal contestation reinforces what should be the starting point for thinking about issues of multiculturalism and rights: that cultures are not monolithic, are always in the process of interpretation and re-interpretation, and never immune to change”.<sup>2</sup> It is easy to agree with this statement, yet it is difficult to find satisfactory ways for the political implementation of this idea. It is necessary to provide an explanation of the institutional arrangements required by a constructivist approach to culture. As already mentioned, the institutionalisation of cultural differences might easily have essentialist consequences.

The institutional arrangements required for deliberative notion of recognition should consider the constructed notion of culture and the key principles of deliberative democracy. The most direct implication of constructivist theories of identity formation for multiculturalism and democracy is that there is no universal formula of politics of recognition. Accordingly, group-specific policies are only one form of implementing the politics of recognition. Ethnic groups take different forms depending on the structural configurations and historical experiences in a particular society.

Although deliberative democrats agree on the necessity of deliberative politics in culturally diverse societies, they are not explicit about the institutional arrangements and background conditions this approach requires. One of the most contested issues for

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<sup>2</sup> “Gender, Justice, Development and Rights” Report of the United Nations Research Institute of Social Development Workshop, cited in Deveaux (2003:794).

deliberative democrats is the recognition of formal group rights and, more specifically, formal group representation. Some deliberative democrats suggest that a system of group representation is necessary as a supplement to a system of individual representation (Young 2000:122; Squires 2002:130, Williams 2000:125). Young characterises group representation as an “important enactment of political inclusion’ (Young 2000:123), but also raises concerns about the potentially essentialist implication of such measures. She notes that “reserving seats for particular groups can tend to freeze both the identity of that group and its relations with other groups in the polity. Some more fluid procedure is desirable for adapting to changing social relations” (Young 2000:149). James shares the same concern and suggests that a flexible deliberative approach requires group representation to take place only in the informal institutions of the public spheres. The strategy of institutionalising group-specific policies within the formal decision-making sphere fails to capture the internal diversity of ethnic groups and changing boundaries associated with constructed identities (James 2004). By similar reasoning, several scholars reject formal representation mechanisms and emphasise instead the role of the informal public sphere in facilitating intersubjective and transformative deliberation. Benhabib (1996:84) argues that “heterogeneity, otherness, and difference can find expression in multiple associations, networks, and citizens’ forums” within the informal public spheres. In a critique of group-specific rights, Jung goes further and argues that formal recognition of ethnic groups excludes these groups and their identity claims from democratic politics. On her account:

because salience and boundaries of ethnic and racial groups are shifting and internally differentiated, groups constituted around symbols of culture should not be constitutionally protected from democratic politics (Jung 2001:221).

The question of whether the formal recognition of group specific rights enables or hinders the inclusion of ethnic groups in democratic politics is difficult to answer. The genuine incorporation of minority groups into democratic politics depends on many other factors including the existence of informal conditions which are discussed later. The deliberative approach, I suggest, does not reject the group-specific policies categorically; rather, it emphasises the necessity of a careful and precise application of these policies. As long as these policies are results of inclusive deliberative processes, and are seen open

to revision, they do not stand in tension to the deliberative approach. The categorical rejection of certain policies prior to any deliberative process would be against the essence of the deliberative project. Furthermore, if we accept that culture and identity are dialogically constructed, we should also acknowledge that there exists no single universal formula for politics of recognition or multiculturalism that fits every society. Multiculturalism manifests itself in different forms depending on underlying policies of recognition and the underlying conception of culture. Multicultural policies might have either individualistic or collectivist points of departure. Accordingly, there exists a variety of institutional possibilities on the spectrum between individual rights and group-specific rights, each suggesting different forms of multiculturalism. For example, compared to Australian multiculturalism, the Canadian experience presents a group-based form of multiculturalism by acknowledging corporate group rights like the Quebec language laws. When understood from a deliberative perspective, the politics of recognition does, and should not necessarily mean a departure from the liberal framework as most of its critics fear. In her influential book *Tolerance as Recognition*, Galeotti suggests a differentiated overview of the forms that a politics of recognition can take on policy terms. The spectrum of the institutional measures she suggests reveals that cultural rights introduced under the politics of recognition must not be understood as the group-based collectivist rights (Galeotti 2002; Seglow 2003). It is possible to read Galeotti's spectrum of cultural rights as different forms of accommodating cultural diversity and as various forms of multiculturalism.<sup>3</sup>

The important point here is not to reduce the politics of recognition to the existence of formal group rights and entitlements. The form politics of recognition takes in terms of institutions and formal rights should remain unpredictable and open to revision. Given

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<sup>3</sup> According to Galeotti, it is possible to differentiate the claims for the public recognition of minority identities roughly into five categories. The thinnest form of recognition is the introduction of the measures which limit the toleration of practices that offend the dignity of the ethnic group, such as laws against 'hate speech'. The thickest form of recognition, that is her final category, encompasses a number of claims about the ideas of government or self-determination. The measures include giving minorities quota places or reserved seats in legislators. In their radical form, such measures encompass claims for 'collective liberty', i.e. the collective right of a group to the non-intervention of the state in its communal life. Galeotti's differentiated account of recognition suggests that identity claims are not an all-or-nothing affair, and the official responses to such claims vary enormously (Galeotti 2002:197).

this, what gains significance from a deliberative perspective is less the final, definitive form of recognition on institutional terms, but more the *process* of recognition and the necessary conditions ensuring continuous struggles of recognition. This requires above all the existence of dialogical mechanisms not only for inter-cultural forms of deliberation, but also for intra-cultural forms (Deveaux 2003). As Deveaux states, intercultural conflicts involve most of the time intra-cultural conflicts over the interpretation and meaning of certain cultural practices (Deveaux 2003:784). It is therefore important to understand the necessity of dialogical mechanisms facilitating intra-cultural deliberation.

In addition to formal rights and opportunities, the deliberative approach places emphasis on the informal types of recognition citizens evince to one another in their everyday interactions. It is this type of recognition that gives the existing rights and opportunities first their meaning. The literature on politics of recognition and multiculturalism usually overlooks the informal requirements for recognition. The narrow definition of the politics of recognition as an official state policy might be useful in comparing the formal forms of recognition in culturally diverse societies. Yet, it fails to capture the informal types of recognition which implies citizens' attitudes towards one another. In this context, the formal types of recognition can be seen as a vertical relationship between individuals and the state, while the informal types of recognition implies the horizontal relationship among individuals.

The form multiculturalism takes depends considerably on interplay between the formal and informal types of recognition. This suggests that the institutions or policies alone do not shape the politics of recognition. Similar institutional measures might have different effects in different contexts, depending on how citizens interact and the prevailing discourses of cultural diversity in a given society. Informal recognition implies the existing values and attitudes that citizens of a culturally diverse society evince one another in their daily interactions. This type of recognition is shaped as a result of existing discourses of cultural diversity employed by politicians, in media or literature. Informal recognition does not require affirmation of minority identities in legal and

political terms. Seglow (2003:84) asserts “the majority need only affirm that the minority identity is different from their own, is valuable at least on its own terms”. This form of recognition is more difficult to reach than official forms of recognition on legal and political terms. The formal institutions of accommodating cultural diversity and the discourses of cultural diversity mutually constitute each other.

The deliberative approach defended here suggests that formal/legal forms of inclusion are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for a deliberative accommodation of cultural diversity. The liberal understanding of inclusion is solely about the extension of equal rights and opportunities to individuals who do not have them. A deliberative notion of inclusion should go beyond this form of inclusion by ensuring the necessary conditions of ‘social inclusion’. This is where the informal types of recognition and the existing discourses of cultural diversity in the wider public sphere gain importance. Ultimately, it is difficult to make sense of legal opportunities that are open to one, if one is publicly disregarded.

### **Concluding Remarks**

The traditional understanding of recognition and multiculturalism is closely linked to the concept of a fixed and authentic identity. When understood as such, politics of recognition runs the risk of essentialising ethnic identities as its opponents fear. This paper aimed to understand politics of recognition in the context of multiculturalism from the perspective of deliberative democracy. I argued that the way culture and identity are conceptualised has important implications both for multiculturalism and democracy. Based on the constructivist approach of culture and identity constitution, I outlined the core features of the deliberative democracy and why this approach merits particular attention in the face of cultural diversity. The deliberative perspective presented here has revealed that the politics of recognition is not an all-or-nothing affair, and that group-specific policies are just one form of implementing the politics of recognition. As argued above, recognition and multiculturalism manifest themselves in a variety of ways depending on the contextual and structural factors in a given society. One of the important factors this paper has emphasised is the informal types of recognition which

give formal rights first their meaning. The formal rights and entitlements are important, but not sufficient, conditions for a deliberative notion of recognition. The deliberative notion of recognition defended here emphasises the informal types of recognition and the role of an informal public sphere in the constitution of identities. Informal types of interaction in the public sphere can be seen in some cases as a supplement; in others, as an alternative to the democratic politics within the formal spheres. The deliberative accommodation of cultural diversity suggested here requires the existence of rights and opportunities enabling legal and social inclusion of all affected parties, and the ongoing, open-ended struggles of recognition.

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