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Merle Spriggs PhD

Merle Spriggs

Professional Work Experience

Research Interests

In contemporary bioethics discussions, standard theories of autonomy rely on the idea that people have some kind of life plan, or at least a stable set of values. When someone receives a devastating diagnosis they may act in ways that could be interpreted as a departure from a previously held life-plan or stable values. In my master's thesis I looked at examples of people who were to some extent self-determining despite having suffered a traumatic life-event. Now, I am exploring some of the issues more systematically. I am trying to work out what we are really referring to when we talk of autonomy.

I have begun by tracing the history of the development of the contemporary idea and by looking closely at the ideas of Rousseau, Kant and Mill. I have also traced the way in which the principle of respect for autonomy got into contemporary American bioethics via The Belmont Report. Also, because of the wide influence of Beauchamp and Childress's Principles of Biomedical Ethics in the field of bioethics, I look at the changes that take place in their chapter on autonomy. This shows us how many in the field view the concept of autonomy.

In contemporary discussions it seems that when we speak of autonomy there are quite different ideas that we may be referring to. Modern theorists invariably appeal to Kant but do they really understand Kant? Is the notion of autonomy they use one that is true to Kant? If it is not, what kind of concept or concepts are they using?

Finally I will try to work out if there is a useful idea of autonomy for the clinical context - one which can deal with traumatic events such as a devastating diagnosis.

Masters Thesis

"Autonomy and Shattered Assumptions" (1995)

Abstract : Existing well developed accounts of autonomy do not seem to apply to situations other than those in which a person's life goes along on a reasonably settled path. My concern is with instances in the clinical context where a person has to make a decision in the face of dramatically changed circumstances - when a person's life-plan or fundamental assumptions have been shattered.

I argue that the emphasis given to life-plans in some accounts of autonomy detracts from the importance of the present by over valuing the future. What is more, the life-plans referred to in discussions of autonomy do not readily admit the possibility that bad things can happen to a person. In the clinical context bad things do happen to people and the essence of such traumatic events is the disintegration of a person's life-plan. I consider examples of people who are to some extent self-determining despite their having suffered a traumatic life event.

Recent Publications

Refereed Journal Articles

Book Reviews and Booknotes

Other Journal Contributions

Memberships

  1. Health Issues Centre Editorial Committee. Health Issues Centre is an independent policy/research institution.
  2. Southern Health Care Network Dandenong Human Research and Ethics Committee.
  3. Australian Bioethics Association
  4. Research Ethics Committee – Wesley Central Mission
  5. Australian Institute of Health, Law and Ethics.

Centre for Human Bioethics